On August 3, 1981 nearly 13,000 of the 17,500 members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) walked off the job, hoping to disrupt the nation's transportation system to the extent that the federal government would accede to its demands for higher wages, a shorter work week, and better retirement benefits. At a press conference in the White House Rose Garden that same day, President Reagan responded with a stern ultimatum: The strikers were to return to work within 48 hours or face termination. As federal employees the controllers were violating the no-strike clause of their employment contracts. In 1955 Congress had made such strikes a crime punishable by a fine or one year of incarceration -- a law upheld by the Supreme Court in 1971. Nevertheless, 22 unauthorized strikes had occurred in recent years -- by postal workers, Government Printing Office and Library of Congress employees, and by air traffic controllers who staged "sick-outs" in 1969 and 1970.
The controllers argued that they deserved these higher wages due to the highly stressful nature of their very important work. The federal government balked at these budget-busting demands of more money for less work, well aware that other federal employees were likely to take action to improve their lot if PATCO succeeded. The FAA made a $40 million counteroffer which included a shorter work week and a 10 percent pay hike for night shifts and those controllers who doubled as instructors. Nonetheless, 95 percent of PATCO's membership rejected the final settlement. The FAA began work on a contingency plan that would go into effect if a strike occurred.
Designed to take place during the busiest time of the year for airlines, the strike threatened major carriers like Braniff, Eastern, American and TWA, who reported losses of $30 million a day during the strike. These companies had been counting on a summer surge in business to offset losses due to fare and route deregulation which had spurred the growth of new, smaller carriers that effectively competed with the giants. Concern grew regarding the extent to which the strike would impact business and the economy. Airlines employed 340,000 people and revenue losses due to the strike forced some to resort to layoffs and management wage cuts. The fresh fruit, fresh flower and fresh fish markets depended on swift air transport, as did other industry in need of spare parts, health care services for blood supplies, and the financial system for paper fund transfers. But other businesses prospered thanks to the strike -- among them Trailways and Greyhound, the Amtrak rail service, and car rental agencies, as travelers sought alternate means of transportation.
To the chagrin of the PATCO strikers, and the surprise of nearly everyone else, the FAA's contingency plan functioned smoothly, minimizing the strike's effects. Approximately 3,000 supervisors joined 2,000 non-striking controllers and 900 military controllers in manning airport towers. The FAA ordered airlines at major airports to reduce scheduled flights by 50 percent during peak hours for safety reasons. Nearly 60 small airport towers were scheduled to be shut down indefinitely. Air Line Pilots Association members diminished the risk of an "aluminum shower," as controllers euphemistically called an air accident. Before long, about 80 percent of airline flights were operating as scheduled, while air freight remained virtually unaffected.
The controllers argued that they deserved these higher wages due to the highly stressful nature of their very important work. The federal government balked at these budget-busting demands of more money for less work, well aware that other federal employees were likely to take action to improve their lot if PATCO succeeded. The FAA made a $40 million counteroffer which included a shorter work week and a 10 percent pay hike for night shifts and those controllers who doubled as instructors. Nonetheless, 95 percent of PATCO's membership rejected the final settlement. The FAA began work on a contingency plan that would go into effect if a strike occurred.
Designed to take place during the busiest time of the year for airlines, the strike threatened major carriers like Braniff, Eastern, American and TWA, who reported losses of $30 million a day during the strike. These companies had been counting on a summer surge in business to offset losses due to fare and route deregulation which had spurred the growth of new, smaller carriers that effectively competed with the giants. Concern grew regarding the extent to which the strike would impact business and the economy. Airlines employed 340,000 people and revenue losses due to the strike forced some to resort to layoffs and management wage cuts. The fresh fruit, fresh flower and fresh fish markets depended on swift air transport, as did other industry in need of spare parts, health care services for blood supplies, and the financial system for paper fund transfers. But other businesses prospered thanks to the strike -- among them Trailways and Greyhound, the Amtrak rail service, and car rental agencies, as travelers sought alternate means of transportation.
To the chagrin of the PATCO strikers, and the surprise of nearly everyone else, the FAA's contingency plan functioned smoothly, minimizing the strike's effects. Approximately 3,000 supervisors joined 2,000 non-striking controllers and 900 military controllers in manning airport towers. The FAA ordered airlines at major airports to reduce scheduled flights by 50 percent during peak hours for safety reasons. Nearly 60 small airport towers were scheduled to be shut down indefinitely. Air Line Pilots Association members diminished the risk of an "aluminum shower," as controllers euphemistically called an air accident. Before long, about 80 percent of airline flights were operating as scheduled, while air freight remained virtually unaffected.
Reagan stressed that he derived no satisfaction from sacking the controllers. He pointed out that he was the first president to be a lifetime member of the AFL-CIO. And he was aware that PATCO had been one of the few unions to support his presidential bid. "I supported unions and the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively," he wrote in his memoirs, " but no president could tolerate an illegal strike by Federal employees."
